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Distributional Consequences
of Environmental Regulation: Economics,
Politics, and Environmental Policymaking
Joseph P. Tomain
April 22, 2170

(DOCUMENT I)

On this, the Bicentennial celebration of Earth Day,
environmental archaeologists have made an extraordinary
discovery. In the early 1990s, two decades after the
"environmental movement" in the United States began, the
town of Lawrenceville decided to establish a "new
environmental order" by engaging in an exercise in
environmental policymaking. Little remains of the program
that was implemented. The town of Lawrenceville is now
either a bucolic pasture or a sprawling metropolis, our satellite
pictures and institutional memories are indecipherable from
this distance in space and time. Nevertheless, two documents
remain which help us locate the quaint environmental policies
that Lawrenceville contemplated.
These two documents also reveal the pre-modem method
of determining which environmental policies would guide the
town. At that time, Lawrenceville let the citizens decide the
town's environmental course. Apparently, the town did not
have access to the sophisticated and reliable methods of
policy analysis now available to us. It is unfortunate that our
satellite pictures are unclear because we cannot ascertain the
success or failure of Lawrenceville's "experiment in
democratic choice" as one of these documents so charmingly
put the matter.
Therefore, for edification or amusement, we commend to
your attention two historical records: "Technical Paper No.1"
by Policy Consultants, Inc. and "Environmental Policy
Report" by Lawrenceville Environmental Action Committee.

TECHNICAL PAPER NO. 1

Joseph Tomain is currently the Dean and Nippert Professor of
Law at the University of Cincinnati College of Law.

To: Lawrenceville Environmental Advisory Committee
From: Policy Consultants, Inc.
Re: Background Assumptions and Technical Concepts
Date: February 1, 1991
Executive Summary
The Lawrenceville Environmental Advisory Committee
(LEAC) commissioned Policy Consultants, Inc. (PCI) to
perform a baseline study evaluating the tools available to
environmental policymakers. Environmental policymaking is
an exercise in applied economic and political theories. Yet,
before we reach the application stage, familiarity with theory
and terminology is necessary. In Technical Paper No.1, PCI
presents the background assumptions and technical concepts
needed for LEAC to design an environmental policy for
Lawrenceville. Once familiar with the lexicon of political
economy, LEAC can identify the programs, frame the
choices, and suggest decision-making methods for
Lawrenceville's environmental program.
Background Assumptions
1. Lawrenceville
Lawrenceville is a moderately sized university town
situated in the middle of the United States with residential,
industrial, commercial, and mixed zones and with a typical
range of economic classes. In other words, Lawrenceville is
the home to the rich, the poor, and mostly the in-between.
Relatively progressive politically, as such mid-western towns
are, Lawrenceville is concerned about its environment.
Further, Lawrenceville is concerned about environmental
equity as much as it is about environmental quality, and it is
quite conscious of associated environmental costs.
In the spirit of participatory democracy, Lawrenceville
assembled government officials, industry representatives,
citizens, and a sprinkling of experts (including a lawyer and
an economist) to form the Lawrenceville Environmental

Summer 1991

HeinOnline -- 1 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 101 1991

Tomain

Consequences of Environmental Regulation

Advisory Committee (LEAC) for the purpose of developing
an environmental policy. Technical Paper No. I is intended
for its use.

individual choice.
For the market to function competitively, certain
conditions must exist:

2. Environmental Perspectives
In framing an overall environmental policy, LEAC must be
aware that there are three contemporary perspectives on the
environment. The first perspective is the traditional path of
energy-environmental regulation in which economic growth is
the dominant part of the policy.l A counter-perspective can
be described as the End of Nature 2 or the Limits to Growth 3
perspective in which drastic changes in current energyenvironmental policies are necessary to avert global disaster.
The third perspective is an attempted synthesis of the first
two. It is called the sustainable development perspective4 in
which a current environmental policy "meets the needs of the
present without compromising the ability of future
generations to meet their own needs."5
These three perspectives present distinct ways of looking at
the world, and they generate distinctly different policies.
However, we present these views not to demonstrate how they
are different, but rather to illustrate how they are similar.
Each makes claims of efficiency. Although these are
apparently different policies and their distinctions are
grounded in different assumptions and beliefs about the
world, each perspective claims that it is better because it will
maximize social welfare. Each perspective claims to promote
economic growth. 6 Some of the perspectives claim that their
policy will make the world a nicer, happier, and "better"
place. Yet, each also argues that it is cheaper. Consequently,
we suggest that LEAC not ignore matters of economic growth
and efficiency.

(1) there must be numerous buyers and sellers;
(2) there must be a large enough quantity of goods
so that no single buyer or seller perceives that he
can affect price by varying either the quantity
demanded or supplied;
(3) the product must be homogeneous;
(4) there must be accurate and complete product
information for buyers and sellers; and
(5) there must be freedom of entry and exit from
the marketplace 8

3. The Market and Government Regulation
The political economy of the United States is based on the
assumption that the give and take of a competitive market is
desirable. Theoretically, a market facilitates capital
formation, encourages technological innovation, limits
transaction costs, and promotes individual liberty and
equality.
In short, markets promote growth, efficiency, and preserve
personal freedom. Given this list of virtues, there is no good
reason for government intervention in the face of competitive
markets because, at the very least, government intervention
raises the cost of doing business and reduces gains from
trade'? Moreover, government intervention may stifle, rather
than promote competition, by inefficiently restricting an
industry, or it might redistribute wealth and income in
undesirable ways. Finally, it substitutes collective for

The world as we know it does not conform to the micro
economic model of competitive markets. The nasty and
brutish marketplace is frequently imperfect because the
competitive conditions do not exist. Buyers or sellers flex
their market power muscle. Information is inaccurate,
skewed, wrong, deceptive, or fraudulent. Production involves
social costs, such as pollution, and creates wasteY Each of
these defects can hamper the efficiency of the market and can
hinder economic growth. As if things are not bad enough,
wealth and income are unevenly distributed in society, and
imperfect markets can aggravate such uneven distribution.
Government regulation, then, can be used as a means of
correcting market defects for the express purpose of
enhancing efficiency or for redistributing wealth or income.
Government regulation in general, and environmental
regulation in particular, are the government's response to
perceived imperfections in a less than free market. LEAC,
therefore, can justify environmental regulation by identifying
a market imperfection.

4. The Structure of Environmental Problems
The discipline of welfare economics lO helps explain and
justify government intervention in the area of environmental
regulation. Welfare economics, of which environmental
economics is a specific application, holds that private markets
do not always take account of the social costs associated with
production and consumption. The basic premise of
environmental economics ll is that the residual effects of
consumption and production activities are not accounted for in
the price of the product. l2 Consequently, reliance on a
laissez-faire political philosophy, or on the free market, is
likely to interfere with the wisest use of society'S scarce
resources and adversely affect Lawrenceville's environmental
quality.
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Environmental problems are complicated and can be
characterized as polycentric,13 an attribute requiring the
special attention of Lawrenceville's policymakers and
decision makers. Frequently, an environmental issue will
involve multiple parties from both the public and private
sectors. A policy to improve air or water quality, for example,
can involve federal, state, and local government officials, as
well as industry, labor, and neighborhood representatives.
Further, the participant's level of interest varies. A federal
official may be less sympathetic to the peculiarities of a local
situation than a town council member. Similarly, although
both are private citizens, the interest of a member of a
grassroots environmental group is likely to differ in intensity
from that of an employee whose job may be affected by
stringent environmental regulation.
Environmental problems are often multi-jurisdictional and
transgenerational. The siting of hazardous substances
facilities involves federal, state, and local law, and these
regulatory layers may overlap or conflict. Further, many
hazardous substances affect not only the present environment,
but future generations as well. Radio-active waste, for
example, will affect the environment for thousands of years.
Environmental issues also contain positive and normative
complexities and uncertainties. The long-term consequences
of low-level radiation are scientifically uncertain. The
longevity of salt domes housing spent nuclear fuel is
technologically uncertain. Likewise, cost-benefit analyses
comparing one policy with another are often economically
and financially uncertain. In comparison to these positive
uncertainties, an obvious example of a positive complexity is
the resolution of a large, long-term, multi-party, multijurisdiction law suit.
Normative uncertainties and complexities abound in
identifying, framing, and interpreting the data, information,
and resolution of such polycentric matters. It should be
pointed out that polycentric environmental problems involve a
variety of disciplines such as science, technology, economics,
finance, law, sociology, and politics, therefore, it would not be
incorrect to label environmental problems as socioscientific,14 trans-scientific,15 or hybrid. 16 These multidisciplinary problems, with their attendant complexities and
uncertainties, do not lend themselves to simple resolution.
Nor do they lend themselves too often to technical,
quantitative resolutions. Rather, environmental policymaking
is more a political act than it is an exercise in objective,
scientific, or technical methodology. 17
These background assumptions are presented so that
LEAC can place its environmental policymaking within the
context of the contemporary political economy. Although we

start with a predisposition toward the free market, it is at least
equally likely that government intervention may be needed to
improve Lawrenceville's environmental quality. To better
assess whether intervention is warranted and, if so, which
regulatory tools should be used, PCI has briefly described
some fundamental technical concepts.
Technical Concepts

1. Efficiency
Efficiency can be roughly defined as a policy that either
maximizes wealth or reduces costs. More refined definitions
would include an explanation of Pareto optimal efficiency
theory: an optimal state in which it is no longer possible to
change states without harming at least one person
economically. A corollary definition is one of Pareto
superiority: a change of state that improves the position of at
least one person without harming another. However,
efficiency as defined in Kaldor-Hicks terms is a change of a
state resulting in net benefits outweighing net costs with no
requirement that winners compensate losers.18 These
definitions will help LEAC assess the likely efficiency of the
environmental programs it develops.
2. Value
To assess efficiency, it is necessary to assign some "value"
to a program. Under the efficiency criterion, the value of a
good or service is based on a person's "willingness to pay".19
Markets neatly value goods and services based on that
willingness. Unfortunately, it is impossible to make
interpersonal comparisons of social utility regarding
environmental quality because it is impossible to know
accurately how any given individual values the quality of the
environment. Ability to pay also enters into the valuation
process, but ability to pay need not detain us at this juncture.
It should be emphasized, however, that the valuation process
based on willingness to pay thus depends on a relatively wellfunctioning market.
3. Distribution
It is conceivable that a particular policy can be efficient by
increasing the value of environmental amenities in
Lawrenceville. It is also conceivable that those amenities, or
the costs of those amenities, will be distributed unevenly,
therefore, policymakers are advised to pay attention to the
distributional consequences of their policies. Neither the
Pareto nor the Kaldor-Hicks models of efficiency presuppose
a particular distribution. The Kaldor-Hicks model requires
only the theoretical ability to compensate losers. Actual
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compensation is not required for the model to work, and a
policy determined by the model to be "efficient" may actually
increase distributional inequities.
The distributional effects of environmental regulations
involve at least three variables and suggest a fourth. First,
environmental regulations are intended to distribute benefits.
Second, they also distribute costs, and the discussion of costs
and benefits naturally devolves into a discussion of costbenefit analysis. Third, a sound cost-benefit analysis depends
on the identification of competing programs rather than on an
abstract discussion of costs and benefits in general. 20 These
three elements, costs, benefits, and programs set the stage for
the fourth variable, policymaking. More accurately, the
policymaking question might well be reduced to: How should
the payments be made and by whom?

4. Positive and Normative Economics
In their analysis of distributional consequences,
policymakers should distinguish between two uses of
economics: positive and normative. Positive economics
describes what the economic consequences of an activity are
or are likely to be. Normative economics evaluate what the
consequences of an activity are or what the best state of the
world ought to be. Normative economics is more properly the
domain of the policymaker or the political theorist, than the
pure economist.
Thus, normative economics is
distinguishable from positive economics because it is
expressly evaluative rather than descriptive.
5. The Tiebout Model
The Tiebout Model is an attempt to provide a market-based
solution to the distribution of public services. Given many
local governments and fully mobile, well-informed
consumers, individuals will choose a neighborhood because of
a package of public services such as schools, parks, roads,
libraries, and fire and police protection. In this way,
consumers exhibit their preferences and the "value" they place
on public amenities by voting with their feet in their choice of
neighborhoods. 21 Similarly, individuals can choose to live in
one neighborhood or another depending on environmental
quality.
6. The Coase Theorem
A simple formulation of the Coase Theorem is: "If there
are zero transaction costs, the efficient outcome will occur
regardless of the choice of legal rule."22 Three corollaries of
the theorem are significant for policymakers. First, the
assignment of a legal entitlement does affect the allocation of
transaction costs. Second, the allocation of transaction costs

affects the distribution of wealth. Third, the existence of
transaction costs may affect efficiency. Clearly, legal rights,
in this case, environmental regulations, do affect distribution
and efficiency. As LEAC assesses the costs and
consequences of environmental policies, it should pay
attention to the transaction costs of the regulations and the
method of imposing those costs.
7. Arrow's Impossibility Theorem
Economist Kenneth Arrow theorizes that even in a simple
democratic process where people represent their preferences
by voting, individual preferences cannot be aggregated into
rational social preferences. 23 Although a policymaker may
prefer Program A to Program B and may prefer Program B to
Program C it does not follow that a policymaker prefers
Program A to Program C! There is no transivity in the
policymaker's preference. "If we are concerned about
defining public interest, Arrow's Theorem presents a
conceptual barrier to combining individual preferences into
some overall measure of social welfare. If our concern
instead is with voting methods, Arrow's Theorem shows that
no method of voting is immune from breakdowns. "24
At first glance, Arrow's Theorem suggests that the
policymaker's task is impossible. We believe that the
theorem advises LEAC to take care in how a policy is chosen
rather than focusing on achieving the "optimum" public
policy.
8. Cost-Benefit Analysis
Public policymakers often use cost-benefit analysis in
choosing between competing projects. In a lengthy study of
federal cost-benefit analysis, the authors defined its use as:
[D]etermining the social goals to be maximized,
identifying and assessing accurately and
comprehensively the benefits and costs of proposed
agency action, accounting for who will benefit by each
option in a detailed manner and by whom the costs of
each will be borne, and providing an exposition of
alternatives detailing the foregoing information will
assist the decisionmaker in choosing among several
possible actions (including no action).25
As it manages complex data and focuses on positive and
normative issues, LEAC should find that cost-benefit analysis
is a useful tool for comparing several policies.
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LA WRENCEVILLE ENVIRONMENTAL ADVISORY
COMMITTEE
Environmental Policy Report
The Lawrenceville Environmental Advisory Committee
(LEAC) hereby submits its first environmental policy report
to the governing body of Lawrenceville. Contained in this
report is a discussion of three environmental policies
considered by LEAC:
(1) The Clean Streets Program-to improve the
quality of the streets in the poor neighborhoods so that
these streets are of the same quality as those in the rich
neighborhoods.
(2) The Clean Air Program-to improve the air
quality from Paper Mill, Inc. so that all of the citizens
breath cleaner air.
(3) The Outdoor Recreation Program-to enhance
the recreational amenities of the Lawrenceville
reservoir by improving fishing, swimming, and
boating facilities.

After a series of meetings, testimony from interested
parties, and extensive discussion and debate, we find that each
of the policies considered has many pros and cons, as well as
benefits and costs. We further find that the adoption of one or
more of the suggested policies is best accomplished through
the give and take of the political process, rather than through
assignment to a group of technical experts. Therefore, we
make no specific recommendations as to adoption or rejection
of one or more of these three policies. Rather, our
recommendation is that the Lawrenceville body politic
consider this report and adopt its recommendations as
appropriate.
LEAC believes that several goals are paramount in the
adoption of any environmental policy for the town of
Lawrenceville. We believe that Lawrenceville should
improve the quality of the environment equitably and
efficiently. We further believe that any environmental policy
should be conscious of the distribution of benefits and costs to
our citizens.
LEAC assumes that Lawrenceville can improve the quality
of the environment equitably, and efficiently, without any
drastic change in lifestyle. LEAC recognizes that extreme
environmental perspectives exist and that perhaps a better

world can be attained by dramatic changes in lifestyles.
However, LEAC does not address issues of lifestyle because
lifestyle is too murky and amorphous an idea for
policymaking purposes. We are in no better position than the
citizens of Lawrenceville to decide how individuals should
live their lives relative to the use and consumption of energy
and environmental goods. Therefore, we explicitly avoid
making "lifestyle" choices for Lawrenceville and leave such
choices to the political process and to individual lives.
As we proceed through our analysis, LEAC recognizes that
the concepts of efficiency and distribution have dramatic
implications for the design, choice, and the implementation of
any particular policy. For the purposes of this report, LEAC
assumes that more wealth is better than less, and that less cost
is better than more. Given these assumptions, we can proceed
to assess three specific environmental programs.

Programs
LEAC presents the Town of Lawrenceville with a
discussion of the distributional consequences of three distinct
and perhaps complementary environmental programs. The
first program, the Clean Streets Program, is intended to have
pro-poor environmental effects. Next, the Clean Air Program
is intended to be wealth-neutral. The third program regarding
outdoor recreation appears to have pro-rich consequences.
The discussion of each program presents the likely
distribution of benefits and costs. Each discussion concludes
by speculating on the overall efficiency of the program.

The Clean Streets Program
Distribution of Benefits. Even the most hardened
microeconomic theorist recognizes that wealth is not evenly
distributed throughout society. Some individuals are poor and
some individuals are rich. It is not too much to extend this
assumption by saying that the poor and the rich do not live in
the same neighborhoods, although in many locations they are
not too distant neighbors. Consequently, we recognize that
the introduction of any government program, let alone an
environmental program, upsets the financial status quo. We
also acknowledge that transition costs are associated with any
change in legal relationships.26
In a town of rich and poor, how should environmental
benefits be distributed? If the initial distribution of wealth is
unequal, a pro-poor environmental policy is not unreasonable.
An example of a pro-poor environmental policy would be to
spend money cleaning the streets in a poor neighborhood to
make them as clean as those in a rich neighborhood. The
Clean Streets Program would require increasing public
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expenditures in poor neighborhoods to equalize the
potentially will impose two costs on Lawrenceville. The first
distribution of environmental benefits among all citizens.
is the direct cost of cleaning the streets. The second is the
indirect cost of foregoing some other resource if
There is no effective market in clean streets. Absent an
elaborate regression analysis, people choose neighborhoods
Lawrenceville reallocates expenditures. Total cost depends
for a panoply of amenities such as house and yard size,
on the method of funding. If additional funds are raised, then
property values, schools, proximity to
the town incurs only direct costs. 29 If
employment, as well as the cleanliness of
expenditures are reallocated, then direct
This realization of
the streets. Of course, it is no accident
costs may be reduced or eliminated, but
that the streets are cleaner in richer
indirect costs are also incurred.
neighborhoods, but it seems a far stretch
The distribution of costs depends
costs and the method of
to single out clean streets as a dominant
directly on how those costs are funded.
reason for choosing a neighborhood.
Lawrenceville can consider different
financing the program funding methods. First, a clean streets
Although we relax this assumption for the
next program, here we assume that it is
surcharge can be levied evenly, either per
capita or per household, among all
difficult to gauge the value of clean streets are integral in assessing
to consumers because it is only one in a
residents. Under this method, some costs
package including many amenities. Here
are distributed onto the rich with no
offsetting benefits. Second, a surcharge
we assume that it is too difficult, and too the wisdom of the policy.
costly, to isolate clean streets from that
can be levied on the beneficiaries thus
package. 27
distributing costs directly to the poor.
Because we cannot tell if either rich or poor value clean
Third, an explicitly redistributive policy can be adopted and
the increased tax can be assessed against the rich. Fourth,
streets more, we assume that all people value clean streets
Lawrenceville can choose to reallocate resources by moving
equally. As a corollary, we assume that the benefits of clean
streets are equally enjoyed across the population. Absent
funds from one program to another. Finally, Lawrenceville
can choose to let the "market" decide. In the case of clean
reliable empirical evidence to the contrary, it is not
streets, the market is for a package of public goods and
unreasonable to assume that rich and poor equally value and
equally enjoy the benefits of clean streets.
residents "choose" their package by moving into particular
Thus, if we assume that persons equally value and equally
neighborhoods. The market method depends on whether there
enjoy the benefits of clean streets, an environmental program
is a relatively well- functioning market in clean streets. We
that equalizes the distribution of this particular environmental
have assumed, however, that such a market is not available.
benefit is reasonable even though it has identifiable pro-poor
effects.
The Clean Air Program
From a distribution of benefits standpoint, if our policy
Distribution of Benefits. The Clean Streets Program is
improves the lot of the poor and does not disadvantage the
aimed at improving the environmental quality of the poor
rich, then the policy is Pareto efficient. Additionally, if the
neighborhoods. Matters of economic discrimination are
benefits to the poor neighborhood are greater than the losses
delicate, yet necessary. Other environmental programs less
to the rich one, the policy satisfies the Kaldor-Hicks
obviously benefit one economic class or another. In
efficiency test as well.
Lawrenceville, for example, Paper Mill, Inc. is the source of
Life, even economic life, is hardly so simple. Adopting a
air pollution that adversely affects much of the town with little
zero-sum approach,28 any increase in expenditures for
regard for neighborhood boundaries. Depending on air
cleaning the poor neighborhood must come from somewhere,
patterns, some neighborhoods are affected more than others,
and we cannot know if the benefits outweigh the losses until
but this is a function of air currents, not prosperity. Over
the costs are calculated. We also cannot know whether the
time, air pollution harms all citizens and properties. An
program is efficient until costs are discussed. Further, costs
environmental policy that reduces the amount of air pollution
are imposed someplace in the economy. This realization of
will benefit all citizens in relatively equal measures.
costs and the method of financing the program are integral in
Therefore, the Clean Air Program can be characterized as
assessing the wisdom of the policy.
providing a wealth-neutral distribution of benefits insofar as
every individual's quality of life is evenly and equally
Distribution of Costs. The Clean Streets Program
improved. 30

III

The Kansas Journal of Law & Public Policy

HeinOnline -- 1 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 106 1991

Consequences of Environmental Regulation

Tomain

This raises the question of how much
an individual values an improvement in
the quality of the air he breathes. As with
the Clean Streets Program, there is no
obvious way to compare intersubjective
preferences. A poor citizen might
subjectively "value" clean air more than a
rich citizen, but those measurements are
difficult, if not impossible, to make.
Consequently, we assume that all
Lawrenceville citizens value clean air
equally. Given the relatively equal distribution of pollution,
the extent to which persons can choose to live in
neighborhoods with cleaner air is not clear. Land values and
rents may reflect the quality of the environment so that under
the Tiebout model, individuals can choose clean air as an
amenity. The reality is that the distinction between rich and
poor, relative to clean air, lies somewhere in between pure
equality and the Tiebout world.

can then be used to purchase appropriate
pollution controls for Paper Mill, Inc.
Another method is also available to
Lawrenceville. Air pollution is the classic
example of a spillover cost or an
externality. Paper Mill, Inc. prices its
products based on its costs. These prices,
however, do not include the social costs of
the air pollution. To better reflect the true
cost of production, Paper Mill, Inc. should
internalize those social costs by
incorporating production costs, profits, and social costs into
its prices. The failure to "internalize the externalities" means
that Paper Mill, Inc.'s goods are over-consumed and waste is
created. This market failure also suggests that at least the
direct cost of pollution control should be imposed on the
factory, rather than on the citizens, either through additional
taxes on polluting factories, or a reallocation of resources. 32
Assuming that Lawrenceville chooses this method of
financing its Clean Air Program, the issues of indirect costs
and the distribution of direct costs are more clearly raised.
Assuming that Paper Mill, Inc. is not a monopoly, but is a
company in a competitive industry, the imposition of
pollution control costs will affect profitability.33 Increased
costs reduce profits and those most likely to be affected are
shareholders, consumers, and workers. How much cost for
pollution control a company can bear depends on its ability to
"shift this initial cost burden to consumers by raising prices,
or to workers in the form of lower employment, lower wages,
or both, or to shareholders through smaller dividends."34
If Paper Mill, Inc. is in a moderately competitive industry,
as costs rise, prices will rise, and consumers will bear the
costs; or profits will decline and shareholders will bear the
costs; or some combination of the two. If the industry is
highly competitive and Paper Mill, Inc. cannot raise prices
without loosing market share, then profits will decline. In
either case, if other firms do not bear similar pollution control
costs, then increased costs will also reduce profitability.
If Paper Mill, Inc. is a marginal firm and the pollution
control costs are high, the added expenditures will threaten the
operation of the company and the jobs of Lawrenceville
citizens. The loss of jobs and revenue constitute indirect costs
that have a dramatic effect on how Lawrenceville citizens
"value" improved air quality. If the worst case occurs, can
Lawrenceville afford the unemployment and the reduced tax
base?
Until the direct and indirect costs are calculated, we have
no way of knowing whether the Clean Air Program is either
Pareto or Kaldor-Hicks efficient, even though environmental

A poor citizen might

subjectively "value"

clean air more than a
rich citizen . ...

[G]eographical location has, to some degree,
permitted individuals to purchase different
environmental qualities in accord with differences in
their effective demands and, as is to be expected, this
bears a strong relationship to income. The poor live
in the most heavily polluted sections of metropolitan
areas, while the wealthier seek out the more
attractive sites. . .. The rich and the poor cannot
afford to live too far apart; the latter offer jobs to the
poor, and the former offer services to the rich. 31
The distribution of benefits should cut across all economic
classes. Everyone, rich and poor, is made better off by
cleaner air. Relative to distribution of benefits, the Clean Air
Program is Pareto efficient because all citizens benefit with no
one being worse off. Yet, caution in this analysis is advised.
Although the benefits may well be evenly and equally
distributed, cost allocation is another matter. Thus, relative to
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, the costs must be assessed before net
gains or losses are known.

Distribution of Costs. The costs of the Clean Air Program,
like those of the Clean Streets Program, are both direct and
indirect. Unlike the Clean Streets Program, the indirect costs
are more identifiable and more substantial. The direct costs
are the costs of pollution control. The indirect costs will be
realized depending on the method of financing that is chosen.
Lawrenceville can raise taxes or reallocate resources as
contemplated by the Clean Streets Program. These resources
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benefits are distributed to everyone. Only if the value of clean
air is greater than the cost; each citizen benefits; and no one
loses in the process, will the Clean Air Program be both
Pareto and Kaldor-Hicks efficient. If the benefits outweigh
the costs, then the program is Kaldor-Hicks efficient without
necessarily being Pareto efficient because either rich or poor
can be made worse off due to the imposition of either direct or
indirect costs.

User fees have at least a surface appeal. The market, rather
than govemment regulation, is relied upon to distribute costs.
Individual autonomy is advanced through a "willingness to
pay." Unfortunately, user fees are likely to be a disincentive
for the poor to use this amenity. Indeed, commentators on
environmental protection have advanced a general argument
that higher income groups have a greater demand than poorer
individuals for such things as clean air, clean water, and
outdoor recreation. 35 This greater demand among the rich is
Outdoor Recreation Program
based on the following assumptions: that environmental
Distribution of Benefits. The Lawrenceville Reservoir
quality is a normal good that is purchased in greater quantity
presents the town with an opportunity to increase the
by individuals with more money; that rich and poor prefer
environmental amenities available to its citizens and others.
environmental quality equally; and that there is a fixed price
Currently, the Reservoir is used to
relative to income. In simpler terms, the
generate hydroelectricity and for the
rich can afford to "buy" more
Increased costs reduce environmental goods than poor
town's water supply. With improvements,
the Reservoir can also be used for fishing,
individuals can. These assumptions seem
swimming, boating, camping, and
reasonable,
and we do not have the data to
profits and those most
increased green space.
refute them. Consequently, the Outdoor
The benefits of the increased use of the
Recreation Program is effectively pro-rich
Reservoir will be distributed directly to
likely to be affected are if user fees are used to distribute costs. If
those persons who use it. Citizens and
Lawrenceville wishes to make this
non-citizens alike can enjoy outdoor
amenity available to all of its citizens
shareholders,
recreation, and the Reservoir will be open
regardless of wealth, then another method
to all.
of cost allocation is necessary and some
sort of public financing is advised.
Desirable as outdoor recreation can be, consumers, and workers.
if one considers outdoor recreation more
Again, to determine efficiency, the
of a luxury than a necessity, this program,
value of the costs as well as the benefits
in contrast with either the Clean Streets Program or the Clean
must be known. User fees are likely to promote efficiency
Air Program, is a pro-rich environmental program. In theory,
because the reservoir will be used in the exact amount that
the outdoor recreation program is available to all; in effect, it
persons value the resource. If redistribution is considered and
is available only to those who can afford the activity. Here,
Lawrenceville wants this amenity available to all of its
unlike the other two environmental programs, ability to pay
citizens, further analysis is necessary. Before the program is
plays a more crucial role. Although swimming and fishing
deemed to be efficient, we need to calculate the value of the
are relatively inexpensive, boating and camping are not,
benefits and the costs. We must also determine whether
benefits outweigh the costs and whether rich or poor or
therefore, wealth matters if the facilities are to be used.
neither are disadvantaged.
Distribution of Costs. As with the previously discussed
DISTRIBUTIONAL CONSEQUENCES OF
programs, the distribution of costs for the Outdoor Recreation
Program depends upon the method of financing improvements
ENVIRONMENT AL POLICIES
to the Reservoir. The public coffers, either through new taxes
We presented three environmental programs and have
discussed the distribution of benefits and costs so that the
or a reallocation of resources, can be used to make the
necessary improvements. Analogous to imposing the costs on
programs exhibit pro-poor, wealth-neutral, and pro-rich
Paper Mill, Inc., the direct costs of either the capital
consequences. It is a curious anomaly that each of these
improvements or operating expenses or both can be levied
programs may very well distribute benefits in a pro-rich
directly on the users through recreation fees. Through user
fashion and distribute costs in a way that disadvantages the
fees, the beneficiaries of the outdoor recreation program
poor. An equally curious phenomenon is that we can
directly absorb the costs.
hypothesize a situation in which each program has the
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opposite effect of a pro-poor distribution of benefits and an
anti-rich distribution of costs.
Pro-Rich Benefits/Anti-Poor Costs
Under the Clean Streets Program, the benefits can be
distributed to the rich if, as the environmental quality of the
neighborhood increases, so too does the land value or the
economic rents. Costs under this hypothesis are distributed to
the poor if the tax is evenly assessed against all taxpayers.
Under such circumstances, the tax is regressive because the
poor are paying a tax that has the effect of pricing them out of
their own neighborhood. The result is a form of
environmental gentrification.
By improving air quality throughout the town, the Clean
Air Program can have similar effects by raising land values
and economic rents. An evenly assessed tax for the Clean Air
Program is just as regressive as the tax for the Clean Streets
Program. In the situation of the marginally profitable Paper
Mill, Inc., the loss of jobs may harm the poor and consumers
more than it harms the rich.
Finally, the Outdoor Recreation Program benefits the rich
because they are more likely than the poor to use the facilities,
and the poor are disadvantaged by not having this amenity
available to them because of the prohibitive cost.
This discussion of pro-rich benefits and anti-poor costs is
intentionally a caricature of a lopsided environmental policy,
yet the point is instructive. The distributional consequences
may not achieve that which is intended. To emphasize the
point, we can hypothesize the opposite consequences.
Pro-Poor Benefits/Anti-Rich Costs
The Clean Streets Program can have attributes of a propoor policy with anti-rich costs by taxing only the rich or by
assessing a progressive tax to clean the streets in poor
neighborhoods. Likewise, a Clean Air Policy can be designed
that improves air quality for all, including the poor. The
Clean Air Program could provide for reallocation assistance
or job training for the poor who may lose their jobs because of
factory pollution controls. In addition, the program could
impose the pollution control costs on the company's
shareholders, or it could ask the rich to subsidize the program
through a progressive tax. Finally, an Outdoor Recreation
Program can be designed that provides discounts or direct
subsidies to the poor at the expense of the wealthier users
through higher fees for boaters than for bathers.
All of which is to say that distribution, redistribution
really, matters and is a central issue in environmental
policymaking. These antithetical policy positions
demonstrate that policy choices are more than the product of

an economic analysis. The fact that the same policies can
have diametrically opposed sets of consequences indicates
that policymaking comes packaged in an ideological
envelope.
CHOOSING ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES
Given the problems in identifying the costs, benefits, and
distributive consequences of these environmental programs; in
determining the programs' net effects; and the difficulty of
clearly identifying the winners and losers, any policymaker
could reasonably assess the problem as insoluble. Policy
preferences contain deep conflicts, if not outright
contradictions. Indeed, we have no disagreement with the
proposition that the perfect or even best policy may well be
only a theoretical possibility. Yet, Lawrenceville does not
have the luxury of discerning the best state of the world.
Rather, pragmatic choices need to be made even in the face of
great uncertainties. There must be some way to decide which
of the programs is right for our town. Two methods, each
with its own attendant difficulties, are available to
policymakers, cost-benefit analysis and the political process.
Cost-Benefit Analysis
In Lawrenceville, choices must be made among three
environmental programs or maintaining the status quo.
Choices must also be made about methods of funding any of
the programs chosen. For each program, we have begun to
identify the costs and benefits. It should be quite clear,
however, from the admittedly brief discussion, that we have
only hinted at the range of costs, risks, and benefits of each
program.
In the Clean Air Program, for example, the worst case
scenario posited that Paper Mill, Inc. might close, creating
unemployment and a reduced tax base. However,
unemployed workers require social services, and a reduction
of taxes may require further reductions in social services.
Yet, the closure of Paper Mill, Inc. may result in a new
industry moving to Lawrenceville, one that pollutes less,
employs more, and increases taxes. Unfortunately, crystal
ball gazing is part of cost-benefit analysis.
Cost-benefit analysis is of limited usefulness and cannot be
relied upon as the sole public policymaking tool. Frequently,
the transaction costs of gathering data and information may
cost more than the program itself. We have not even begun to
explore the toxicological and epidemiological consequences
of air pollution because gathering and analyzing such
information is simply too expensive an undertaking. Nor can
cost-benefit analysis provide trustworthy data on the value of
human health or life. Indeed, quantifying such matters as the
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that the market for environmental quality is seriously
value of a life saved by reduced pollution is an uninformed
defective, particularly because of the externalities involved,
guessing game. Cost-benefit analysis tends to work best with
then regulation is justified and political choices are necessary.
quantifiable variables.
LEAC believes that the market in environmental quality is
Cost-benefit analysis can gather data, sort information, and
seriously defective and that cost-benefit analysis is inadequate
highlight sensitive normative and positive issues. The method
to decide among competing projects and among various uses
is a way to deal with large masses of complex and often
for public funds.
conflicting quantitative data. Cost-benefit analysis, however,
cannot decide delicate moral, social, and political issues that
[T]he essence of environmental issues is that they
arise in the allocation of scarce natural resources.3 6
Whatever the technical and theoretical criticisms of costinvolve externalities and public goods. The
combination means that only in rare cases can we
benefit analysis, public decision makers must choose from
appeal to familiar theorems about the splendid
among competing alternatives, and they must articulate the
reasons for their choice. Cost-benefit analysis assists decision
welfare results produced by the free market. ... An
makers in articulating the reasons for their decisions by
explicit decision in favor of a non-market
identifying the costs, risks, and benefits. The rationale
mechanism opens a wide range of alternatives for
consideration .... "38
behind public decision-making must be explicit if the decision
is to attain legitimacy. If the goals or the objectives of the
We further believe that public decision-making on matters
public decision maker are not articulated, then the decision
of general policy cannot be left to an
may not be publicly accepted.
Parenthetically, as a matter of law, the
Cost-benefit analysis is advisory committee or an "expert" body
such as an administrative agency or
reasons for administrative decisions must
be given in order to satisfy due process.
special task force. Such bodies can be
Thus, the rationale behind public decisions of limited usefulness and
directed to design, implement, and
evaluate particular plans, but choosing
must be given so that the decision is both
cannot be relied upon as environmental programs should be left to
politically and legally legitimate. 37
the democratic process.
Controversy over environmental law
Three democratic methods suggest
and policy is inevitable. Although it can
themselves:
Lawrenceville's elected
be argued that objectively identifiable
the sole public
conflicts are capable of specific resolution,
officials who serve in a legislative
capacity can choose; an environmental
at least theoretically, public policy issues,
policymaking tool.
program can be the product of a town
because of their normative content, do not
meeting; or environmental initiatives can
have objectively verifiable and
be placed on the ballot. Each of these methods have different
scientifically correct answers. Instead, the resolution of
refinements, but they are all methods of democratic choice.
public policy conflicts depends on a legitimate and politically
acceptable decision-making process. Legitimacy can be
LEAC recognizes that democratic choice is not fault free.
Choosing an environmental program through any of the listed
attained through the give and take of the political process even
methods is subject to the flaws of majoritarianism,
though we recognize that the "best" solution may not be
factionalism, and strategic behaviorism among other
attained. Public decision-making fundamentally involves
imperfections. Still, democratic choice is valuable precisely
political choices, and cost-benefit analysis is best regarded as
because it promotes public participation, approaches
merely one tool for illuminating the issues. In effect, costlegitimacy, and incorporates ideology. Overall, we believe
benefit analysis sets the stage for the political decisionthat the democratic process is a better way to reflect the public
making process.
interest than reliance on either formal cost-benefit analysis or
"expert" policymakers.
The Political Process
If cost-benefit analysis is a defective decision-making
As a matter of political choice, two basic alternatives
method because it obscures socio-political norms, then the
present themselves, the free market or government regulation.
"Choosing" the free market simply means doing nothing:
political process suffers from the opposite defect of
inattention to quantitative and techno-scientific matters.
allowing the "market" to allocate and distribute the benefits
Furthermore, it is not unlikely that financial self-interest will
and costs of environmental quality. If policymakers decide
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playa significant role in public decisionmaking regardless of whether private or
public individuals or interest groups are
deciding. The role of self-interest may
cause majorities or factions to bend the
"public interest" to their liking. This is a
regrettable circumstance. However,
excessive self-interest is tempered and the
range of choices is limited by the
institutional arrangements that guide the
formation, the execution, and the
evaluation of public policy.
Because of constitutional constraints,
Lawrenceville cannot
adopt
an
environmental program that is irrational,
too costly, or distributes substantial costs
or substantial benefits to one group or another. Substantively
and procedurally, the public policymaking process must
comport with the Constitution, statutes, and ordinances duly
enacted. Any environmental program that is adopted must fit
the tradition and extant laws under which the citizens of
Lawrenceville live. To ensure that the environmental program
has the requisite consistency, legitimacy, and rationality, the
judiciary exists to curb policy abuses or the
disenfranchisement of segments of our citizenry.
An imperfect world to be sure, yet it is a rational one
committed to a democratic rather than a bureaucratic ideal.
The political decision-making process is also committed to the
history and tradition of constitutionalism and to the
democratic ideals of robust debate, public deliberation, and
open choice.
We believe that "in a democracy, the political process
creates the public interest in the process of searching for it."39
Consequently, LEAC's environmental programs should be

The democratic process

part of the democratic agenda of
Lawrenceville.

is a better way to reflect

Conclusion
Environmental
programs
are
polycentric. Such programs involve
numerous public and private actors and
contain issues imbued with substantial
positive and normative uncertainties and
complexities. There is no single "expert",
individual, or agency that can or should
set such policies. Rather, the "best"
outcome may well be the one that
achieves the greatest legitimacy, through
public acceptability that is achieved
through the political process, and not
through the microeconomic model.
LEAC and its Environmental Report can be seen either as a
success or a failure depending on your particular view of the
policymaking process. If you perceive the policymaking
process as one that reaches the "optimum" outcome based on
the best available empirical (for our purposes scientific,
technological, financial, and economic) data, then you may
label this experiment a failure for refusing to make specific
recommendations. If, however, you see policymaking as a
democratic process with equal parts of public participation,
individualism, pluralism, and capitalism, then the
recommendation to submit the three environmental programs
to the political process as an experiment in democratic choice
should make sense and win widespread endorsement.

the public interest than

reliance on either formal
cost-benefit analysis or
"expert" policymakers.

Respectfully submitted,
Lawrenceville Environmental Advisory Committee
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